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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of minimum wage in a dominant firm model. It is 
shown that in a labor-intensive market, the introduction of a binding minimum wage 
creates an entry barrier in the short run and increases unemployment in the long 
run.  
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Aufsatz gehen wir der Frage nach, wie sich die Einführung eines Mindest-
lohns in einem „Dominante-Firma-Modell“ auswirken wird. Wir haben gezeigt, dass 
in einer arbeitsintensiven Industrie, die von einem Großunternehmen dominiert wird, 
die Einführung eines Mindestlohns kurzfristig zu negativen Folgen für den 
Markteintritt neuer Unternehmen und langfristig zu höherer Arbeitslosigkeit in der 
Branche führen kann. 
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Douglas Production Function 
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1 Introduction 
The minimum wage is a highly controversial topic in economic research. According 
to neo-classical theory, the introduction of a minimum wage either causes unem-
ployment to rise or has no effect. On the other hand, many researchers argue that 
the labor market is not a perfect market. One important variation is that employers 
have some monopsony power over employees (Manning 1995, 2003; Boal and 
Ransom 1997; Stigler 1946; Card 1992). Another strand of research on this problem 
comes from efficiency wage theory, which introduces the idea of substituting “bad” 
jobs for “good” jobs (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Rebitzer and Taylor 1995; Acemoglu 
2001; Cahuc et al. 2001).  
In present-day minimum wage theory, monopsony is assumed to describe the labor 
market but not the goods market. In this paper, we discuss the introduction of a 
minimum wage to a goods or service market with a dominant firm and a competitive 
fringe. Our goal is to show that the outcome of this policy decision differs signifi-
cantly from results obtained under the full monopsony or efficient wage assump-
tions.   
We employ the standard dominant firm model described by Scherer and Ross 
(1990) and Cherry (2000), using the Cobb-Douglas Production Function (Cobb and 
Douglas, 1928). Section 2 presents this model, and Section 3 discusses our results. 
Finally, the Appendix provides a simple numerical example of minimum wage intro-
duction in the dominant firm model. Before continuing, however, we shall conduct a 
brief literature review. 
1.1 Earlier studies of minimum wages 
Current discussions on the introduction of minimum wages are mainly based on two 
ideas: labor market monopsony (Manning 1995, 2003; Boal and Ransom 1997; Stig-
ler 1946; Card 1992) and the efficiency wage model (Acemoglu 2001; Rebitzer and 
Taylor 1995; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Cahuc et al. 2001). In both models the 
goods market is assumed to be competitive. The monopsony model assumes that 
companies have some market power over their employees, so the introduction of a 
minimum wage will improve both welfare and employment (Manning 1995, 2003; 
Boal and Ransom 1997; Stigler 1946; Card 1992). The efficiency wage assumption 
states that a minimum wage operates in the same way as the no-shirking condition 
of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model (Rebitzer and Taylor 1995; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; 
Cahuc et al. 2001). In this case the minimum wage has a positive effect on em-
ployee welfare and may also be positive for employment in the long run. The reason 
is that introducing a minimum wage causes the companies to gradually shift from 
“bad” jobs, which become inefficient and expensive under a minimum wage restric-
tion, to “good” jobs which are efficient and profitable (Acemoglu 2001). 
In this essay, we would like to describe the introduction of minimum wages in a third 
context: the dominant firm model. In two previous studies of dominant firm behavior 
(Richards 1983; Williamson 1968), wage increases were modeled as an endoge-
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nous strategy of the dominant firm. The result was a spill-over of wages from the 
dominant firm to the competitive fringe, increasing the costs of competitors and driv-
ing them out of the market. In our case this decision is assumed to be exogenous, 
for example when state law decrees a binding minimum wage. 
2 Model description and assumptions 
We discuss the impact of minimum wages in a service market composed of one 
large firm and a competitive fringe of newly emerging companies. One example of 
such a market is the postal service in Germany, which was once a state monopoly 
but is now evolving towards a competitive market. Our model is based on the domi-
nant firm model (Scherer and Ross 1990; Cherry 2000) and a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function (Cobb and Douglas 1928). We will show that a minimum wage in 
this model impacts the development of competition in the short run, and also make 
some suggestions regarding its effect on unemployment in the long run. 
In order to simplify our theoretical model, we make several assumptions. First, we 
assume that the dominant firm has a labor-intensive production function (for exam-
ple, a postal delivery service). In this we differ from the “good” versus “bad” jobs 
theory, which assumes capital-intensive production (Acemoglu 2001). We do not 
need to distinguish between skilled and unskilled labor as efficiency wage models 
do (Cahuc et al. 2001), because we assume that the efficiency gains from skilled 
labor are not large service firms The dominant firm and the competitive fringe are 
assigned different Cobb-Douglas production functions in order to model the domi-
nant firm’s cost advantage (i.e., it still reaps benefits from the historical monopoly). 
In the case of a mail delivery company, this advantage could be derived from a well-
established network, advanced logistics, and/or superior knowledge accumulated 
over the years.  
The production functions are as follows:  
Y = AN0.5, A>1 for the dominant firm, and 
Y = N0.5 for the competitive fringe. 
The important variables are defined below. 
N - Employment  
A - Cost advantage of the dominant company 
K - Capital. This constant is set to one, since we are dealing with service company 
p – Price 
w – Wage  
Q = a – bp - Total market demand (a and b are constants) 
π = pY-wN - Profit 
wN – Total employment cost  
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Note that employment is the only cost for service companies in our model 
2.1 Model solution 
For the competitive fringe, the profit is given by 
2wYpYwNpY −=−=π . (1) 
As the price p is set by the dominant firm, the competitive fringe can consider this 
variable fixed. The profit maximization conditions are as follows: 
p = 2wY (2) 
Y = p/2w (3) 
For the dominant firm the production is  
Ydom = Q – Y = a – bp – p/2w, (4) 
so they set a price of 
p = (a – Ydom)2w/(2wb + 1).  (5) 
Its profit function is then 
πdom = pYdom – wY²/A² = Ydom(a – Ydom)2w/(2wb + 1) – wY²/A² (6) 
The corresponding maximization conditions for the dominant firm are  
aw/(2wb + 1) – Ydom(2w/(2wb + 1) + w/A²) = 0 (7) 
Ydom* = aA²/(2A² + 2wb +1)  (8) 
and the price set by the dominant firm is 
12
122
2
*
2
2
+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
−
=
wb
w
wbA
aAa
p . (9) 
The total market demand at price p* is 
12
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2
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2
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After simplifying, the market share of the dominant firm is 
1222
)12(
22
2
+++
+
=
wbAwbA
AwbShdom . (11) 
If we differentiate the market share with respect to w, we obtain 
222
4
)1222(
2
+++
=
wbAwbA
bA
dw
dShdom . (12) 
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This term is significantly positive, meaning that any wage increase (for example, the 
introduction of a minimum wage above the current market wage) increases the mar-
ket share of the dominant company and decreases the market share of the competi-
tive fringe. As the minimum wage increases, the market share of the dominant firm 
approaches an upper limit that depends on its cost advantage factor: 
1
lim 2
2
+
=
∞→ A
AShdomw  (13) 
Thus, under the assumption of cost advantage the market share of the dominant 
firm will increase. In the short run the dominant firm’s profits will decrease, but the 
profits of competitive fringe will decrease even more due to their cost disadvantage 
(Rebitzer and Taylor 1995). In the long run the number of small firms in the market 
will decrease (Rebitzer and Taylor 1995), and the share of the competitive fringe will 
continue to decline. The minimum wage also establishes an entry barrier for new 
companies in the market (Rogerson 1984; Williamson 1968). Thus, we can expect 
an increase in unemployment in the industry due to the shift of production to the 
dominant firm with a cost advantage. The “worst” case will be the re-monopolization 
of the market.  
Apparently, a binding minimum wage reinforces the position of the dominant firm in 
the long run. In the short run it will tend to increase unemployment in the industry. 
So the policy decision to introduce a binding minimum wage in a market with a 
dominant firm could be rather harmful. 
3 Conclusion 
This analysis has tried to establish a new point of view on minimum wages. Rather 
than assuming a perfect labor market or some degree of monopsony, we consider a 
market with one dominant firm. Our goal was to show that a minimum wage restric-
tion increases the difficulty of establishing a competitive market. Empirical research 
using data from various labor and goods markets is still needed to support this the-
ory. Some interesting and typical markets with this structure are the European postal 
delivery markets. 
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Appendix 1 (Numerical Example): 
To understand how the introduction of a minimum wage affects a dominant firm 
market, it is helpful to look at the following numerical example. 
We assume a cost advantage factor of A = 2 for the dominant firm, while the market 
price sensitivity b is set to unity. The market share equation then becomes 
910
48
+
+
=
w
wShdom . (1) 
When the minimum wage rises above the market clearing wage, the dominant firm’s 
market share will increase. If the wage increase is due to the introduction of a mini-
mum wage, the value of the market share increment is also defined by the exoge-
nously set level of minimum wages. If this level is sufficiently high, the dominant firm 
can take up to 80% of the entire market.  
If the cost advantage factor is higher, the increase in the dominant firm’s share in 
response to a wage increase will be more dramatic. High cost advantage combined 
with a high level of minimal wages allow the dominant firm to virtually monopolize 
the market. Graph 1 depicts the market share function with A (cost advantage fac-
tor) and w (wage level) as the independent variables. 
Figure 1 
 
As seen in Figure 1, under these theoretical assumptions a new minimum wage 
could make it impossible to establish a competitive market. In the long run, a new 
monopoly could form. 
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